




Università di Roma “Tor Vergata”

# Traffic Flow Confidentiality in IPsec: Protocol and Implementation


*Giuseppe Bianchi, Csaba Kiraly, Renato LoCigno, **Simone Teofili***

*[simone.teofili@uniroma2.it](mailto:simone.teofili@uniroma2.it)*

# Malicious Traffic Analysis




- Length
- Arrival time
- Packets direction




# Source-Destination Link

*Amanda's traffic*




**Bob is communicating with  
Alice!**


*Bob's traffic*



*Carol's traffic*




*Alice's traffic*



# User information recovery


## ➤ Website fingerprinting

- E.g. sample size profile for [www.amazon.com](http://www.amazon.com)
- Bissias, Liberatore, Levine “Privacy Vulnerabilities in Encrypted HTTP Streams”




## ➤ Password recovery

- Canvel, Hiltgen, Vaudenay, Vuagnoux, “timing-based attack to Intercept passwords in a SSL/TLS Channel”
  - Different log-in errors are characterized by different server’s answer times
  - <http://www.brice.info/crypto>




# MixNet basic ideas



Messages:

- wrapped in fix length packs
- grouped and sent in lexicographical order
- in/out correspondence hidden by mix

- "Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms,"  
D. Chaum
- Employs a "network" of mixes to avoid the need of a single trusted one




# Goals

Our goals is to provide a tool:


- implementing the basic mechanisms to prevent statistical traffic analysis attacks
  - Dummy traffic
  - Packets padding
  - Traffic re-shaping
- Flexible
- Reconfigurable
- Reprogrammable
- Based on common standard
  - IPsec
- Providing a underlying layer for the Anonymous Routing Networks
  - Supporting different kind of traffic

# Traffic Flow Confidentiality Protocol



**TFC, like ESP and AH, can be managed exploiting the instruments Offered by IPsec (SA, SAD, SPD, ...)**


# TFC architecture






# TFC Header

- TFC protocol header contains
  - Security Parameter Index (SPI)
  - Protocol transported
  - Size of the data
- The header is inserted between the ESP header and the payload
- The padding is added between the payload and the trailer ESP




# TOCT- Type of Confidentiality Treatment

- TOCT (Type of Confidentiality Treatment)
  - carry information about the type of treatment the packet may be subjected to
  - used in a multi-hop fashion, and especially for building IPsec-based Mix Networks.
- Still to evaluate information disclosed!!




# Packets fragmentation


- It has been necessary to add an extension header (FRAG)
- If needed the last fragment is padded



# Packets Output Stack



# Packets Input Stack




# Control Logic


- The "control logic" is the "intelligence" of the system
- It can combine the TFC basic mechanisms arbitrarily:
  - batching,
  - CBR (Continuous Bit rate),
  - random padding,
  - random delay algorithms
  - Queue congestion Reactive algorithm (still experimental)
- Simple methods (fixed or random packet clocking), may be easily replaced by more complex algorithms
  - Able to take into account the status of the queues and/or the congestion level
- The effectiveness of such adaptive approaches in terms of performance/privacy gains and trade-offs is still to be assessed

# TFC SA parameters

- A User Space application allows to configure TFC SA parameters
  - Delay Algorithm
  - Dummy
  - Padding
  - Fragmentation
  - Packets Length
  - Bit Rate






# Test over Public Network Tunnel Roma - Trento





# TFC flows sample

- We tested the TFC basic mechanisms modifying the statistical characteristics of a Data flow, in order to obtain a Random Bit Rate, CBR (constant bit rate) traffic.




# Protocol fingerprinting


- Accurate flow classification exploit its very first packets
  - Length (L. Bernaille, R. Teixeira, and K. Salamatian, “Early Application Identification”, Proceedings of The 2nd ADETTI/ISCTE CoNEXT Conference, Portugal, 2006)
  - Inter-arrival time (M. Crotti, F. Gringoli, P. Pelosato, L. Salgarelli, “A statistical approach to IP-level classification of network traffic”, IEEE ICC 2006, 11-15 Jun. 2006)
- TFC tunnels avoid classification since
  - Packets are padded
  - Delay algorithms modify packets inter-arrival time
  - Different application flows can be multiplied on the same TFC SA.

# Flows correlation

- The Discreet page downloads in 1.3 seconds and generates 88 Kbytes of traffic. The same download with CBR TFC takes 4.7 seconds and 130 KBytes



# Web site fingerprinting



## Conclusion


- The TFC IPsec security service provides effective protection against statistical traffic analysis techniques
- We introduces fragmentation and packet inter-arrival time variation to balance the protection-performance tradeoff
- We are evaluating how to increase the protection-performance tradeoff exploiting more complex control algorithms
- We are planning to include in the basic tools packets multiplexing

# Malicious Traffic Analysis

192.168.100.45 72.21.206.5 TCP HTTP GET WWW.AMAZON.COM



client  
192.168.100.45




WWW.AMAZON.COM  
72.21.206.5





EAVESDROPPER


Download from Amazon



# Traffic Flow Confidentiality




# Traffic Flow Confidentiality





# Output Stack



# Dummy packets

- A timer is associated to each queue. When the timer expires, a packet from the head of the queue is sent and the next timer is set
- If the queue is empty, we create a new dummy packet (IP protocol = 59) and send it
- Since the queue is situated before IPsec encryption, dummy packets are sequentially encrypted with data packets

