




# Leveraging Social Links for Trust and Privacy

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# Security and privacy issues in OSNs





# The “Big Brother” problem with OSN

- Privacy protection against
  - Intruders
  - Crawlers
  - Third parties

Does not prevent Application Server from disclosing/exploiting your data


All existing OSN suffer from it!






# The “Big Brother” problem

- OSNs market value is increasing
  - 580 million US\$ → Myspace (2005)
  - 15 billion US\$ → Facebook (2007)
- Do users actually care about privacy?






# Safebook - Design Principles






# Safebook - Components






# Safebook - Overlays





# Safebook - Matryoshka



End to end privacy based on hop by hop trust


ed profile data








# User Registration





# a looks for b



## lookup

- a looks for b's entry nodes
- k provides b's outer shell nodes

## data request

- a sends profile data request to an entry node serving b


## Data reply

- One of b's inner shell nodes answers




# Data retrieval

- User 1 wants to get User 2's profile data
- User 2's data is stored by User 3







# Safebook Prototype



Safebook = Resident Program

User




<http://localhost:8080>





# Privacy by Design

- Privacy through layering
- Unlinkability of IDs across layers
- Anonymous communication in matryoshkas





# Security and Privacy


- Privacy
  - Friendship relations hidden through Matryoshkas
  - Untraceability - pseudonymity and anonymous routing
- Cloning and DoS prevention – ID mgr
- Access control – data encryption and key management
- Availability - replication at friends' nodes





# Guessing inner layers – Span = 1


Probability of disclosing the shell behind the outermost one with span=1  
when the attacker knows the friendlists of all the outermost shell nodes





# Guessing inner layers - Span = 2

Probability of disclosing the shell behind the outermost one with span=2  
when the attacker knows one half + n of the friendlists of all the outermost shell nodes







# Performance

## P2P overlay

- Rely on existing studies

## Matryoshka

- End-to-end reachability/delay based on node liveness
- Analogy with P2P





Derive architectural parameters






# Reachability

90% probability of having at least one valid path through the matryoshka, spanning ratio=2





# Delay



Total lookup time:

$$T_{dl} = T_{DHT} + T_{Mat}$$


- Further lookups:  $T_{DHT} = 0$  thanks to caching

(\*) Data computed by applying the montecarlo sampling technique on single hop delay measurements and on delay measurement for a successful DHT key lookup in KAD





# Safebook Summary





# Publications

- Leucio Antonio Cutillo, Refik Molva, Thorsten Strufe  
**Privacy preserving social networking through decentralization**  
WONS 2009, 6th International Conference on Wireless On-demand Network Systems and Services, February 2-4, 2009, Snowbird, Utah, USA ,
- Leyla Bilge, Thorsten Strufe, Davide Balzarotti, Engin Kirda  
**All your contacts are belong to us : automated identity theft attacks on social networks**  
WWW'09, 18th Int. World Wide Web Conference, April 20-24, Madrid, Spain
- Leucio Antonio Cutillo, Refik Molva, Thorsten Strufe  
**Leveraging Social Links for Trust and Privacy in Networks**  
INetSec 2009, Open Research Problems in Network Security, April 23-24, 2009, Zurich, Switzerland
- Leucio Antonio Cutillo, Refik Molva, Thorsten Strufe  
**Safebook: Feasibility of Transitive Cooperation for Privacy on a Decentralized Social Network**  
3rd IEEE WoWMoM Workshop on Autonomic and Opportunistic Communications

